Introduction
A foreigner moves to Belgium, and needs a telephone line in his new apartment.
His Belgian friends wish him good luck, telling him it will take months, unless he has some connections in the public telephone company, or knows a politician who could intervene for him. The foreigner, not being well-connected, reluctantly decides to follow the standard procedure, and visits the telephone company's office the next day. To his surprise, he is the only customer there and is able to file his application within 20 minutes, helped by a very friendly employee. One day later, his telephone is connected. His friends are amazed. Pleasantly surprised about this fast service, he goes back to the telephone company's office, taking a bottle of his native country's wine for the friendly and helpful employee, and asked the employee how comes his telephone was connected that fast, while everyone told him it would take months. The employee smiles and tells him, 'well, you know, you were the first customer in weeks following the normal procedure, and not having some local politician call us. We really appreciated that, and decided to connect your telephone right away'. This joke, emergent from the 1980s, illustrates how political and other 'connections' have been a central element in the functioning of public services in Belgium. Belgium has had an image of being a corrupt country for a long time (Maesschalck, 2002; De Winter, 2003) . A number of high-profile corruption scandals in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to this image, and the structure of the party-political system has been a major factor in some of these cases (De Winter, 2000) . Recently, however, there appears to have been a positive evolution (Van de Walle, 2004b) .
In this chapter, we use a representative survey of 3168 Flemish citizens to analyze the determinants of perceptions of administrative and political corruption.
We will show that citizens' perceptions of corruption are embedded in general attitudes towards government and that subjective corruption indicators may be heavily influenced by predispositions towards government, and therefore do not reflect the respondents' personal experience with corruption. Because many citizens do not have frequent personal experience with corrupt practices, the answer they give in surveys is influenced by other factors. The absence of an experiential basis allows respondents considerable freedom to take certain other attitudinal aspects into account. This creates problems of comparability and invites respondents to broaden their frame of reference to whatever factor they wish when giving an opinion on corruption. Perceptions of administrative corruption, hence, both contribute to the general attitudes towards the administration and government as well as being a consequence of them (Van de Walle, 2004c) .
In the first section we briefly present some of the available survey material on citizens' perception of public sector corruption in Belgium. Using data from a general survey administered in Flanders (Northern part of Belgium) in 2003, we subsequently analyze determinants of general perceptions of corruption and unethical behavior. We show that these perceptions are to a large extent influenced by feelings of political alienation and general attitudes towards government. It is therefore difficult to distinguish cause and effect between trust in government and perceptions of corruption. We then will show that general perceptions of corruption should not be seen as an expression of individual experience. Parallels become apparent with how citizens evaluate government services, where a disconnection seems to exist between generally positive personal bureaucratic encounters and more negative attitudes towards public services in general. We end by reviewing possibilities for avoiding 'contamination' of perceptions of corruption by general attitudes towards government, and for developing indicators that better measure actual corruption.
Perceived corruption in Belgium
By means of an introduction, we briefly present some of the available survey data on citizens' perception of corruption in Belgium. The 1995 ISPO General Election Study (Beerten, Billiet, Carton, & Swyngedouw, 1997) revealed that 29 percent of Belgians thought politicians to be more corrupt than other individuals, while 65.5 percent did not see a difference. This study also revealed that citizens have more problems with politicians who demand bribes or payments for granting government contracts than with politicians who accept money for a contract. A politician using bribes for funding his or her personal election campaign is considered more reprehensible than is a politician who transfers the money to his or her political party, although 73.9 percent of respondents overall viewed accepting bribes as Considering bribes to be unjustified does not lead to perceptions of corruption to be lower in a particular country, though there are exceptions. Perceptions regarding accepting bribes is actually quite similar across most countries, despite differences in CPI scores. In only a few Central-European countries is accepting bribes considered to be somewhat more justified, yet the differences remain small. Respondents each received three mailings: an introductory letter, the questionnaire with postage-paid return envelope and a reminder. As an incentive, a limited number of gifts (approx. 0.5 to 1 percent of respondents) was given to respondents by means of a lottery.
What determines perceptions of corruption? An analysis
The survey contained a number of issues related to corruption and favoritism, five of which are analyzed here in greater detail. Three of these articulate corruption-related issues, the other two focus on issues of equal treatment. 3 In the 2003 survey, 25-44 aged are underrepresented, 45-60 aged tended to return the questionnaire more often, and the +70 category is again underrepresented.
Response was higher in rural areas. and get what they're entitled to, while over half of the respondents disagree.
In the next step, we attempt to explain these attitudes by socio-demographic characteristics, social attitudes, voting behavior, and media exposure. Sociodemographic variables are gender, level of education (six levels), and age (six The three media variables measure whether an individual reads reputable newspapers, watches the news on public television, and/or watches news on commercial television. The five dependent variables have been recoded into trichotomous variables. Table 4 gives the results of the multivariate ordinal logit regression models. The strongest models are these explaining attitudes towards the items 'civil servants are more corrupt than normal people' and 'politicians are more corrupt than normal people'. Opinions about political corruption are strongly influenced by party preference. Extreme right voters are more likely to think that politicians are more corrupt than other people. Just eight percent of the extreme right voters disagree with the statement that politicians are more corrupt than normal people.
Social-democrats and liberals are less likely to think politicians are more corrupt than other individuals. At the time of data collection, these were the two main parties in the regional and federal governments, but an alternative explanation could be that certain traditional voter segments of these parties have defected rather early to the extreme right. Respondents with individualistic attitudes are more likely to label politicians as corrupt, as is a lower education, and a propensity to watch the TV news on a commercial TV channel, rather than on public TV.
Perceptions of administrative corruption tend to be influenced by being female, lower educated, scoring higher on individualism, and a somewhat higher authoritarian attitude. As is the case for perceptions of political corruption, a party preference for the extreme right leads to a higher perceived corruption. Voting for Christian-democrats leads to lower perceived administrative corruption. Despite the number of explanatory variables, the models for political and administrative corruption explain just 14.3 and 14.8 per cent of total variation.
The models for equal treatment and for getting what one is entitled to have very low R squares, yet there are a number of significant relationships. Stronger authoritarian attitudes co-exist with stronger beliefs in equal treatment.
Individualism leads to a higher belief that everyone will in the end get what they're entitled to when interacting with public services; Perceptions and expectations of equal treatment are higher among supporters of the social-democratic party, a party whose ideology stresses equality. There are some effects of education and gender:
females and lower educated persons are somewhat more inclined to believe that public service users will get that to which they are entitled.
Christian-democrats, Greens, and Social-democrats are less inclined to believe connections are needed to get something done, while individualism and a lower education leads to a higher perceived need of connections, just as does being female. Those reading reputable newspapers do not agree that connections are needed. Overall, again, the model's explanatory power is quite low.
When we only look at the three models directly dealing with corruption (administrative and political, and the perception that connections are needed), a lower education, high individualism, and a preference for the extreme right are important determinants. All these variables are frequently encountered in the research on political alienation. It is thus likely that, instead of reflecting opinions on or experiences with corruption, the dependent variables could in fact be considered as expressions of this alienation. Stating that connections are needed, or that civil servants are corrupt may therefore be the result of actual experienced corruption, but it may also be part of a general (negative) predisposition towards government. We expand our model, to include a number of political alienation variables. All alienation variables load on a single factor:
• Voting is useless; the parties do what they want to do anyway
• Most politicians promise a lot, but don't do anything In all three cases, almost all alienation variables are significant determinants for the corruption and ethics perceptions. In one of the two cases where relationships are not significant at the p<0.05 level, there is border significance.
Adding the alienation variables leads to a substantial and even sometimes very substantial increase in explained variance (R²). Together with some party preference variables, alienation accounts for most of the variance in the corruption and ethics perceptions. The impact of extreme right voting, which was relevant in the basic models, disappears, possibly due to the fact that this voting behavior is partly determined by alienation.
What about causality?
The classical, mechanistic explanation for this kind of findings is that citizens feel alienated from their political or administrative system because they perceive it as being corrupt. In this chapter however, we defend the hypothesis that perceptions of corruption are in fact expressions of a more general attitude towards government. A further implication of this viewpoint is that the attitudes as measured in our survey cannot be considered as adequate reflections of actual corrupt practices. We briefly return to this second point towards the end of the chapter.
In previous research on citizens' perceptions of public services and on citizens' trust in institutions we have shown that there is a substantial degree of generalization in respondents' answers to quite general questions (Van de Walle, 2004c Table 5 and to consider citizens' political alienation as resulting from high levels of corruption. Instead, perceived corruption and perceived unethical behavior are an expression of this political alienation. By presenting the perceptions of corruption and unethical behavior as dependent variables, we have further illustrated our point.
Proving causality, however, is not common in social methodology, and often is simply impossible. Yet, causal constructions are an important rhetorical device.
Hence Ruscio's criticism on the all-too-easy prescriptions for restoring citizens' trust in government:
Reactions to the decline (of trust, svdw) have certainly not been lacking, but they typically follow a predictable formula: an analyst's alarmed response which is used to justify a set of prescriptions favored by the analyst. Trust can be restored by -take your pick -term limits, balanced budgets, regulatory reform, reinventing government, campaign reform, responsible journalism, stronger political parties, a third political party, vigorous state and local government, constraints on lobbying or an end to divided government (Ruscio, 1997: 454) .
Limiting corruption and the introduction of an ethics infrastructure could easily be added to this list.
Do general perceptions reflect personal experience?
For citizens, it is not easy to base their perceptions about or attitude towards corruption on personal experience. 'Dienstbetoon' refers to the waning Belgian politicians' habit for holding office every week or month somewhere in their constituency to meet individual citizens.
Traditionally, this practice has been associated with corruption, for example because citizens visited politicians to arrange jobs for family members or to get building permits. Nowadays, however, the practice has evolved into some kind of front-office social work, where politicians are considered easier to approach than are certain national administrations. Politicians are now believed to limit their 'dienstbetoon' to showing citizens the correct administration they should contact with a certain problem or to referring citizens to the ombudsman. Of the respondents in our survey who had approached a politician, 33.9 per cent stated it helped solving the problem, while 49.9 per cent declared it did not. The others (29.9
per cent) took a neutral position.
about government in general that is present in the respondent's mind (Zaller, 1996) .
Most probably this information concurs with general attitudes towards government
and with the general stereotypes of government and administrations (Van de Walle, 2004a ).
Here, a parallel with research on citizens' perception of public services surfaces. For several decades, scholars have repeatedly stumbled on a number of apparent contradictions in citizens' opinion about public services. One contradiction deals with process. Citizens dislike inefficiency but are equally dissatisfied when delivery of services is ruthlessly efficient (Blau, 1956:14) .
Citizens complain about cumbersome red tape and paper-based interaction, but wouldn't like either that the official would forget precious details about the specific encounter (du Gay, 2000) . Both vices and virtues of bureaucratic systems are used to fuel the traditional dislike of the bureaucracy (Hill, 1992) : corruption itself as well as the bureaucratic impersonality that results from anti-corruption measures may give rise to dissatisfaction. An inefficient police force creates dissatisfaction, but so does a police force that is too eager issuing parking tickets. Two dominant images prevail: the lazy, incompetent bureaucrat vs. the power-hungry, manipulative civil servant. It is not quite obvious how these two images may reasonably co-exist.
The other contradiction, perhaps more important here, deals with evaluation.
While many citizens dislike the public administration in general, they are actually quite satisfied with many concrete services. Citizens generally evaluate specific and concrete services in a more positive way than is the case for government in general or for general concepts such as 'the public administration.' The general image of the bureaucracy does not correspond to the evaluation citizens make about their own experience with public services ('bureaucratic encounters'). Public administration scholars started to write about this in the 1970s. One of the earliest extensive studies on the issue was a large-scale study by Katz et al. (1977) on differences in the evaluation of public and private services. They asked respondents to evaluate public and private sector services in general, as well as a recently used public and private sector service. When respondents had to compare public and private sector services, they indeed rated private sector services higher. However, when the comparison concerned the private and public sector service that was used most recently, differences between the evaluation of public and private sector services disappeared. Goodsell devoted an entire book (The Case for Bureaucracy -1983) to the issue of divergence between evaluations of concrete bureaucratic encounters and the general public attitude vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. Most of Goodsell's observations are echoed in other research and articles as well (Grunow, 1981) , and his theoretical explanations do not differ greatly from Katz et al.'s research on bureaucratic encounters. Klages (1981) referred to German research indicating differences in citizens' evaluation of civil servants in general and employees who provide specific public services. Hill (1992: 20) , in his chapter entitled Taking bureaucracy seriously wants to know why citizens state they were treated fairly by the administration, while they don't think governmental offices are giving fair treatment. Although Hill uses some new survey material, his approach does not introduce much more than Goodsell. Hill's evidence found that citizens tend to agree with negative statements about the bureaucracy when these are unrelated to bureaucratic performance and vague enough to serve as an outlet for the stereotypical anti-bureaucratic images (Hill, 1992: 22) . The explanation lies therefore not in the degree of generalizations, as can be concluded from reading
Goodsell, but rather on the symbolic content of concepts and objects and not on the level of abstraction: 'The conventional wisdom in political science and social psychology has been that abstract attitude objects are processed differently than concrete ones. The simple symbolic politics view assumes that processing of political symbols depends on the evaluations associated with them, not on the symbol's level of abstraction' (Sears, 2001: 20) . The abstract objects studied in public administration (government, bureaucracy, civil servants) often bear negative symbolic content, and this content is being reflected when respondents are asked to
give an opinion on the administration or bureaucratic ethics and corruption.
Because of the high level of abstraction of the concept (public administration) or the low level of personal experience (corruption), respondents form an answer that is plausible because it is compatible with the general symbolic content and their own general attitude towards government.
What about perceptions of corruption?
How do we find these processes in perceptions of corruption? In our WADO survey, we also asked respondents to indicate their level of trust in a series of institutions (1=very little; 5=a lot). At the beginning of the questionnaire, a general item on trust in government was also included 6 . Table 6 It would be incorrect however to infer from these findings that citizens experience or have experienced more frequent occurrences of corruption in these non-specific institutions ('the administration', 'government'). In fact, these
correlations merely confirm what we have described earlier. Even though we have not measured perceptions of corruption in very specific and concrete governmental institutions, we can quite confidently state that survey respondents will report lower corruption in many specific institutions than they will for the public administration or government in general. Exceptions to this 'general rule' will then probably be services where there have recently been corruption scandals or services that traditionally had a very negative image. This means that the opinion on corruption is probably part of a general opinion about government and not so much the result of actual experience. General surveys do not distinguish whether these opinions are part of the general attitude towards government or resultant from actual experienced corruption.
The relationship between general opinions about corruption, and general attitudes towards government are also visible in a more international analysis. 
Objective measurement
Possibilities for measuring corruption objectively are sparsely reported in the literature. One approach counts the number of cases related to corruption before the courts. In Belgium, Yante (2003) analyzed the number of lawsuits related to corruption. Despite the often-defective judicial statistics, he did find a decrease and also observed a tendency for more severe punishment in corruption cases. This relatively easy approach negates certain aspects, because corruption is essentially an illegal and hidden activity (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003) . A falling number of lawsuits may also suggest decreasing judicial oversight or more hidden corruption. Essentially, effectively measuring corruption is de facto combating corruption.
Kaufmann et al., in their Governance Matters III working paper, refer to a small number of studies that attempted to measure corruption directly. They mention Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2003) , who measure variation in procurement prices for medical supplies, where high variation suggests there is corruption involved, and Golden and Picci (2005) , who compare expenditures for public infrastructure with existing inventories, where high discrepancies may hint at corruption.
A third approach is to map incentives and opportunities for corruption (RoseAckerman, 1999) , influenced by the demand and supply in the citizen-official encounter. Opportunities for asking or giving bribes may be influenced by the level of discretion exercised by the civil servant or political decision-makers. Incentives are influenced by factors such as the likelihood of being caught, and the savings in time and money to be had by circumventing customary procedures, especially when the customary procedure is long and expensive with unpredictable outcomes.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed determinants of subjective perceptions of corruption in 
